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Abstract
Safety is a simple concept but an abstract task, specifically with aircraft. One critical 
safety system, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS), protects against 
mid-air collisions by predicting the course of other aircraft, determining the possi-
bility of collision, and issuing a resolution advisory for avoidance. Previous research 
to identify vulnerabilities associated with TCAS’s communication processes discov-
ered that a false injection attack presents the most comprehensive risk to veritable 
trust in TCAS, allowing for a mid-air collision. This research explores the viability 
of successfully executing a false injection attack against a target aircraft, triggering a 
resolution advisory. Monetary constraints precluded access to a physical TCAS unit; 
instead, this research creates a novel program, TCAS-False Injection Environment 
(TCAS-FIE), that incorporates real-world distributed computing systems to simu-
late a ground-based attacker scenario which explores how a false injection attack 
could target an operational aircraft. TCAS-FIEs’ simulation models are defined by 
parameters to execute tests that mimic real-world TCAS units during Mode S mes-
sage processing. TCAS-FIE simulations execute tests over applicable ranges (5–30 
miles), altitudes (25–45K ft), and bearings standard for real-world TCAS tracking. 
The comprehensive tests compare altitude, measure range closure rate, and measure 
signal strength from another aircraft to determine the delta in bearings over time. 
In the attack scenario, the ground-based adversary falsely injects a spoofed aircraft 
with characteristics matching a Boeing 737-800 aircraft, targeting an operational 
Boeing 737-800 aircraft. TCAS-FIE completes 555,000 simulations using the vari-
ous ranges, altitudes, and bearings. The simulated success rate to trigger a resolution 
advisory is 32.63%, representing 181,099 successful resolution advisory triggers 
out of 555,000 total simulations. The results from additional analysis determine the 
required ranges, altitudes, and bearing parameters to trigger future resolution advi-
sories, yielding a predictive threat map for aircraft false injection attacks. The result-
ing map provides situational awareness to pilots in the event of a real-world TCAS 
anomaly.
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1 Introduction
The focus of the aviation industry is passenger safety during flight. Airlines have to 
continually balance passenger safety with customer satisfaction. Mid-air collisions 
from cyber capabilities are more than theoretical, but rather a possible occurrence 
given the current communications technology, specifically with a software-defined 
radio (SDR). SDRs are inexpensive radios capable of creating, sending, receiving, 
and processing Mode S signals. SDRs are easily accessible, further expanding the 
number of potential threats [1]. The safety risk to TCAS includes over 1 billion 
travelers each year [2].
TCAS is a critical cyber-physical system designed to prevent mid-air collisions 
between aircraft. The current version of TCAS in use is TCAS II, and it is the focus 
of this paper. Specifically, TCAS uses Mode S communications to exchange dis-
tance, altitude, and bearing information. TCAS processes this information and deter-
mines the feasibility of a mid-air collision, warning the pilot if necessary [3].
1.1  Motivation
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducted a study 
[4] to determine the necessity of an automated system to prevent mid-air collisions. 
NASA tested 16 aircrews (48 individuals in total). The results showed that four 
declared near mid-air collisions (less than 1000 feet horizontal and 200 feet verti-
cal separation) would have occurred during 32 total flights [4]. With an operational 
TCAS, there were zero near mid-air collisions in 96 flights. TCAS reduces the prob-
ability of a near mid-air collision by approximately 87 percent.
If an adversary targets and successfully denies, degrades, or destroys an opera-
tional TCAS, the possibility of a mid-air collision increases. For passenger safety, 
all attack possibilities against TCAS require examination. Previous research into 
TCAS vulnerabilities determined that a false injection attack is plausible [1, 5]. The 
false injection attack presents a risk to the safety and security of passengers. This 
research quantifies the inherent risk of a successful false injection attack against an 
aircraft’s TCAS by creating a novel false injection environment, TCAS-FIE. TCAS-
FIE uses simulation models to determine all possible locations of a successful false 
injection attack. Determining false injection viability informs pilots and industry of 
the actual operational risk during flight.
1.2  Organization
Section  2 provides an overview of TCAS communication security issues and its 
warning notifications, a background of Mode S timing properties, and a review of 
previous research. Previous research results lead to the requirement for a model and 
simulation of a ground-based attacker targeting an operational TCAS. Section  3 
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presents the development of a MATLAB simulation environment, TCAS-FIE, 
that models an adversary targeting a TCAS unit by timing Mode S messages. The 
environment includes distributed computing systems, the ground-based attacker/
equipment and the TCAS unit. Each TCAS reply from the adversary faces a range 
of TCAS tests and requirements for a successful, false injection attack. Tedious 
exploration of the technical specifications and pseudocode for TCAS provided the 
knowledge for creating the TCAS-FIE simulations. Section 4 overviews the process 
of validating and verifying the processes within TCAS-FIE. Section 5 presents the 
simulations’ results and provides a predictive threat map for auspicious false injec-
tion attacks against TCAS.
2  Background
2.1  TCAS system overview
Traffic Collision Avoidance System is the certified collision detection system used 
on aircraft within the United States [6]. It pairs with an aircraft’s Mode S tran-
sponder to conduct collision detection communications with surrounding aircraft. 
TCAS performs its communications using an interrogation and reply process. The 
interrogating aircraft sends an all-call interrogation to all surrounding aircraft within 
30 miles; the interrogating aircraft receives the reply, processes the reported altitude, 
and measures the aircraft’s bearing. Additionally, the interrogating aircraft deter-
mines the aircraft’s distance by measuring the round-trip travel time of an interroga-
tion and reply sequence. With the altitude, range, and bearing, TCAS creates a track 
of the responding aircraft. After the initial reply, TCAS continues to interrogate the 
responding aircraft, until the aircraft no longer poses a threat.
For the communication process, TCAS includes several system components.
• Computer Unit: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) describes the com-
puter unit as the brains of TCAS [3]. It performs all necessary TCAS actions: 
threat detection, threat tracking, collision avoidance determination. After deter-
mining a collision avoidance maneuver, the computer unit creates and displays a 
Traffic Advisory (TA) or Resolution Advisory (RA), alerting the pilot of immi-
nent danger and offers a remedial solution.
• Mode S Transponders: The Mode S [7] transponder allows communication 
between aircraft.
• Control Panel: The control panel is an interactive Mode S transponder control 
switch for pilots. Settings include on, off or standby [3].
• Antennas: TCAS uses four antennas to communicate with nearby aircraft [7]. 
The antennas dually support TCAS and Mode S communications. Modern-day 
TCAS systems have two 1030 MHz omnidirectional antennas, located above and 
below the aircraft, that perform all Mode S communications.
• Displays: Two TCAS displays [3] show real-time traffic and advisories to pro-
vide situational awareness to the pilot. The RA display only alerts when an air-
craft enters an imminent threat zone, representing an approach that could yield a 
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collision. Also, the RA display gives vertical speed and pitch recommendations 
to avoid a mid-air collision.
2.2  TCAS warning notifications
TCAS has two notifications: TA and RA [3]. TAs give potential threat warnings, 
while RAs refer to imminent threats.
The TCAS computer unit develops a TA or RA from algorithmic calculations of 
the interrogated aircraft’s TCAS messages. The two major calculations are for the 
sensitivity thresholds, horizontal TAU and vertical TAU. Horizontal TAU measures 
the closest time to impact on the horizontal plane, or range [8], while vertical TAU 
measures the closest time to impact on the vertical plane, or altitude. If both of the 
TAU measurements exceed set thresholds, a TA or RA triggers.
In addition to the TAU calculations, TCAS monitors reported altitude from air-
craft and calculates the overall range. Altitude is a field within Mode S replies [9]. 
Vertical or altitude separation is also known as ZTHR. TCAS measures range by 
calculating the round-trip time for an interrogation and reply sequence. Range is 
also referred to as DMOD. Issuance of a TA or RA occurs when one of the follow-
ing threshold combinations are exceeded:
• Horizontal TAU and ZTHR
• Horizontal TAU and Vertical TAU 
• DMOD and ZTHR
• DMOD and Vertical TAU 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation for the two warnings. The red represents 
the immediate danger area around the aircraft, when an RA is necessary. The yellow 
area represents a potential risk to the aircraft, when a TA is necessary.
2.2.1  Traffic advisory (TA)
TCAS issues a TA once an aircraft becomes a plausible threat to the host aircraft 
[3]. A TA provides situational awareness for the pilot. Additionally, the TA readies 
the pilot for a potential RA issuance. When a TA occurs, TCAS marks the intruder 
yellow on the traffic display and provides an auditory warning to the pilot.
To determine the necessity of a TA, first, TCAS measures the round-trip travel 
time between its interrogation and the intruder’s reply. Next, TCAS calculates 
Fig. 1  TA and RA visual: Visual 
representation showing when 
TCAS issues an RA or TA to the 
pilot [10] (color figure online)
RATA
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ZTHR, DMOD, Horizontal TAU, and Vertical TAU. If those values exceed the 
thresholds in Table 1, TCAS issues a TA [3].
2.2.2  Resolution advisory (RA)
The final step in the TCAS protective measures is the issuance of an RA. TCAS 
issues an RA once an intruding aircraft becomes an imminent threat to the safety 
of the aircraft [7]. There are different types of RAs; however, they all alert when 
a collision is imminent. TCAS marks the intruder on the RA display as a red dot. 
Additionally, TCAS provides an auditory warning to the pilot, as well as avoidance 
maneuver instructions for the pilot [7]. These instructions ensure a safe encounter 
between the two aircraft.
Similar to the TA process, for RA issuance, TCAS measures the round-trip 
travel time of the interrogation response. From that measurement, TCAS calculates 
DMOD, ZHTR, vertical TAU, and the horizontal TAU. TCAS compares the cal-
culated values against the threshold limits listed in Table 1. If the calculated value 
exceeds the thresholds, TCAS issues an RA.
2.3  Mode S timing
TCAS uses two interrogation and reply types: All-Call interrogations/replies and 
Short TCAS interrogations/replies. Short TCAS interrogations are the same as UF-0 
interrogations and DF-0 replies. An all-call interrogation is the first interrogation 
received during the establishment of a track in TCAS. An all-call reply follows the 
interrogation.
2.3.1  All‑call interrogations/replies
The All-Call interrogation is the first interrogation received by an aircraft. Figure 2 
shows a Mode S interrogation timing layout [7].
The standard for all-call interrogations is 56 bits [10]. The bits send during the 
P6 pulse. Additionally, the transmission rate for Mode S interrogations is 4 Mbps 
[11]. Mode S requires systems to wait for 128 microseconds from the phase sync 
reversal of the interrogation until the rising edge of the replies first pulse [10]. 
Table 1  RA thresholds Ownship altitude SL TAU(seconds) DMOD(nmi) ZTHR(feet)
< 1000 2 N/A N/A N/A
1000–2350 3 15 0.2 600
2350–5000 4 20 0.35 600
5000–10000 5 25 0.55 600
10000–20000 6 30 0.8 600
20000–42000 7 35 1.1 700
> 42000 7 35 1.1 800
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There are 4.75 microseconds from the first pulse of the interrogation to the phase 
sync reversal of the interrogation [10]. This gives a total of 132.75 microseconds 
from interrogation received to the first pulse of the reply. Figure 3 illustrates the 
timing of a Mode S reply. All-Call replies have 56 bits in the reply. The reply bit 
rate is 1 Mbps [7].
2.3.2  Short TCAS interrogations/replies
Once the All-Call interrogation and reply sequence completes, TCAS begins short 
interrogations and replies. The timing of short TCAS interrogations depends on 
the TAU calculation of an interrogation reply. If TAU is greater than 60, TCAS 
interrogates every 5 seconds. If TAU is less than or equal to 60, then TCAS inter-
rogates every second. TCAS has a timing jitter of ± 10 percent from the time 
values.
All-Call and short TCAS interrogations/replies have the same transmission 
rate and bit length. One notable aspect is that the 132-microsecond delay between 
a received interrogation and expected reply allows a window for a potential adver-
sary to falsely inject into an aircraft.
Fig. 2  Mode S Interrogation Format: Layout and timing for Mode S interrogations [7]
Fig. 3  Mode S Reply Format: Layout and timing for Mode S replies [10]
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2.4  Previous TCAS security research
For a critical system, there is little research on protecting and preserving TCAS 
integrity and its communication processes. The lack of TCAS research motivated 
the authors to understand how an adversary would attack TCAS, so that coun-
ter measures could be implemented. Berges et al. focused on creating malicious 
Mode S responses [1]. Hannah et  al. discovered and described possible TCAS 
threats [5]. Both of these authors showed the possibility of a successful false 
injection onto a target TCAS screen, but neither implemented them, which is the 
focus of this paper.
2.4.1  TCAS mode S message creation
Berges et al. [1] focused on the processing and creating of TCAS Mode S mes-
sages. Ultimately, the research showed the successful development of TCAS 
responses. The messages included all required data fields for a TCAS unit to pro-
cess. Additionally, the author processed Mode S interrogations. The ability to 
process and create TCAS messages is key to false injection presented in Sect. 3.
2.4.2  TCAS threat taxonomy
Hannah et al. [5] presents a TCAS threat taxonomy that determined a false injection 
vulnerability presents the highest risk to TCAS integrity, yielding mid-air collision, 
and pilot distrust. It was the only vulnerability to have two significant impacts.
• Pilot Distrust A verifiable false RA creates a distrust in TCAS’s accuracy.
• Near Mid-Air Collision A false RA could alter a pilot’s course that interferes 
with the path of another aircraft.
This taxonomy and the message creation research projects reinforced the neces-
sity for a false injection simulation. The works led directly to the development of 
TCAS-FIE, providing the capability to test false injections against TCAS.
3  Methodology of false injection viability
This section details the design of the novel Traffic Collision Avoidance System-
False Injection Framework (TCAS-FIE), founded in MATLAB, to simulate 
a ground station adversary attacking an operational aircraft. The authors deci-
phered the technical specifications and pseudocode to determine requirements for 
a successful false injection attack and RA trigger. In the environment, TCAS-FIE 
determines an attacker’s viability to successfully time Mode S responses that sat-
isfy all required TCAS tests and constraints, triggering an RA. It also tests air-
craft at different ranges, altitudes, and relative bearings.
 J. Hannah et al.
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The 132-microsecond delay between a received TCAS interrogation and the 
reply [10] yields an opportunity for an adversary to introduce malicious data, sub-
verting TCAS integrity and trust. TCAS-FIE simulates how an adversary would 
exploit this vulnerability to put aircraft at risk.
3.1  TCAS‑FIE environment
The authors created TCAS-FIE exclusively within MATLAB. TCAS-FIE imple-
ments several real-world distributed computing systems within its one environment. 
TCAS-FIE contains implementations of a ground-based attack paired with an SDR, 
processing equipment, and antenna. Additionally, it implements a spoofed aircraft 
with realistic flight profiles. Most importantly, TCAS-FIE imitates a real-world 
TCAS system, with tests and requirements from the TCAS pseudocode [7] imple-
mented and fully operational within the environment. The imitated TCAS system 
also sends interrogations within nanoseconds of a comparative real-world TCAS 
system.
Furthermore, the authors developed TCAS-FIE on a 64-bit Windows-based 
operating system with an Intel Xeon E3-1535M Computer Processing Unit (CPU) 
with 32 GigaBytes (GB) Random Access Memory (RAM). Each simulation takes 
approximately 0.02 seconds. For a set of 500 simulations, the total runtime is 10 
seconds. The set is ran a total of 500 times (8.33 minutes) to ensure the results are 
accurate over multiple trials. The CPU usage during simulations approached 99%. 
For future simulations, graphics processing units (GPU) offer much faster process-
ing time for the simulations. For real-world situations, the results need to be instan-
taneous and provide an accurate average. 8.33 minutes is too long for a potential 
mid-air collision situation. The results of TCAS-FIE determine where RA issuance 
is possible from a ground-based attacker.
3.2  Assumptions
TCAS-FIE simulates an air operational environment with the following assumptions:
3.2.1  Flat earth
Using the flat earth model and associated (x,y,z) coordinates suffice for this simula-
tion. The minimum altitude considered is 25,000 feet. With a ground-based attacker, 
the smallest line of sight is 228.218 miles. The farthest range implemented is 30 
miles, only 13 percent of the visual identification distance possible.
3.2.2  Terrain and weather
The terrain is flat, and the weather is clear. Non-flat land presents a risk for a poten-
tial reflection of signals, while adverse weather limits pilots’ visual identification 
range. This simulation is operationally consistent, since pilots require clear weather 
to verify the existence of an aircraft visually.
1 3
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3.2.3  Aircraft speed and altitude
The spoofed and targeted aircraft are Boeing 737–800s, the most used commercial 
aircraft in the world [12]. Both aircraft travel within ± 10 feet per second of their 
cruising speed. Additionally, TCAS-FIE assumes the target aircraft maintains its 
cruising altitude ± 700 feet from one TCAS interrogation to the next.
3.3  Antenna and transmitter requirements
TCAS-FIE assumes the ground-based attacker has the appropriate equipment to sat-
isfy the signal requirements. TCAS has specific antenna and signal strength require-
ments to accept interrogation replies. Table 2 lists the signal profile for TCAS. [7, 
13].
3.4  Aircraft implementation
TCAS-FIE simulates two B737-800s; one is spoofed, and the other is the target 
aircraft.
3.4.1  Aircraft speed and altitude
The cruise speed of the B737-800 is 0.789 mach or 887.88 feet per second [12]. For 
simulation variance, the aircraft cruising speed varies ± 10 feet per second.
Additionally, the cruising altitude of the B737-800 is 35,000 feet [12]. The alti-
tude varies over different simulations to test all possible range, altitude, and relative 
bearing combinations.
3.4.2  Turning capability
To provide realistic flight paths, the aircraft turn during the simulations. The target 
aircraft turns left or right, altering its course. TCAS-FIE also allows the target air-
craft to maintain its current trajectory. The spoofed aircraft mirrors the movements 
of the target aircraft turns.
The aircraft’s speed and the bank angle determine how many degrees the aircraft 
turns, left or right, in one second. The maximum bank angle without putting the 
Table 2  TCAS power profile Parameter Value
Maximum Power 52 dBm
Minimum Power 32 dBm
Sensitivity – 74 dBm
Cable Loss 0 dB
Maximum Antenna Gain 7.5 dBi
Minimum Antenna Gain 0 dBi
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passenger’s safety at risk is 25 degrees [14]. With the cruising speed and bank angle 
known, the standard rate of turn is 1 degree per second as shown in Eq. 1:
3.5  Program overview
TCAS-FIE runs sets of 500 simulations with the same parameters. After a set com-
pletes, the starting relative bearing from the target aircraft to the ground station 
increases by 5 degrees. After 37 sets with different starting bearings, the altitude, 
range, or altitude and range change. In total, the authors ran 555,000 simulations, 
with 111,000 simulations at each altitude with differing ranges. The following sub-
sections discuss the details of the parameters.
3.5.1  Range
There is variation in the starting range for the target aircraft. The variants are 5– 30 
miles in 5-mile increments. Thirty miles is the max range as the maximum distance 
of TCAS is 35 miles [15].
3.5.2  Altitude
There is variation in the altitude for the target aircraft and spoofed aircraft. The vari-
ants are 25,000– 45,000 ft in 5000 ft increments. This includes the most common 
cruising altitude of aircraft, 35,000 feet [12].
3.5.3  Starting relative bearing
The starting relative bearing of the target aircraft changes after each set of 500 simu-
lations. The original starting relative bearing from target to ground is 90 degrees. 
After 500 simulations, the relative bearing decreases by 5 degrees. Once at 0 
degrees, the next change is relative bearing is to 355 degrees. The final relative bear-
ing is 270 degrees. The range is [90–0] and [355–270]. This relative bearing change 
gives the pilot the possibility of visual identification of an RA inducing aircraft. In 
this attack, there is no actual aircraft, potentially causing the pilot confusion and 
distrust.
(1)




∕1.688 = 525.533 knots
Rate of Turn =
1091 ∗ tan(BankAngle)
Velocity
= .97 degrees per second
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3.5.4  Spoofed aircraft insertion
After the ground station replies to the first interrogation, the spoofed aircraft 
appears on the appropriate TCAS display. The spoofed aircraft has the same 
reported altitude as the target aircraft. To account for the delta in distance from 
the ground versus the distance from a same-altitude aircraft, TCAS-FIE places 
the spoofed aircraft further away on the (x,y) plane.
3.6  Tests implementation
This section presents the implementation of the required tests and limitation 
checks of TCAS. The order of tests follows TCAS’s order of processing. The 
implemented tests and constraints are the received signal power test, bearing con-
straint check, the diverging range test, the TAU range test, and the altitude test.
3.6.1  Received signal power test
TCAS requires a received signal strength of > -74 dBm to accept an interrogation 
reply [13]. The TCAS minimum antenna gain is 0 dBi. The power and gain cho-
sen for the attacker are 50 dBm and 5 dBi, respectively. These are conservative 
values, as individuals have many choices for power and gain capabilities, some 
much stronger than 50 dBm and 5 dBi. TCAS-FIE uses the Friis equation [16] to 
determine the power received by the attacker and if that power meets the specified 
requirement of -74 dBm. TCAS-FIE uses the Friis equation, shown in equation 2:
RxP is receive power, and TxP is the transmit power. TxG is the transmit gain, and 
RxG is the receiver gain. FSPL is the free-space path loss. Free-space path loss is 
the amount that a signal deteriorates over the length of distance that it travels [17]. 
Equation 3 shows the implemented equation for free-space path:
R is the range or distance between the antennas.  is the wavelength of the signal. 
The reply sends at 1090 MHz. Wavelength is the speed of light divided by the fre-
quency of the signal in hertz.
3.6.2  Bearing constraints
TCAS’s bearing constraint error is ± 10 degrees from the estimated bearing [7, 
18]. If a bearing measurement exceeds the bearing error constraint, the track 
coasts or drops. The bearing estimate from TCAS is the average of the first three 
(2)RxP = TxP + TxG + RxG − FSPL
(3)FSPL = 20 ∗ log10
(
4 ∗ pi ∗ R
λ
)
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bearing reportings. From that bearing estimate, TCAS develops a track for the 
intruding aircraft.
With the interrogation replies sent from a ground station, the spoofed aircraft 
bearing reflects the ground station’s relative bearing to the target aircraft. If the 
bearing change exceeds the 5 degrees threshold from the projected bearing, the 
simulation terminates with a constraint failure. The simulations use ± 5 degrees 
due to TCAS’s bearing estimate standard deviation of 5 degrees [7]. Additionally, 
the simulations add the bearing change to the bearing average if the target aircraft 
turns left or right. This accounts for the target aircraft movements and the effect 
on the reported bearings from the spoofed aircraft.
3.6.3  Diverging range test
There are two requirements with the range test [7]. The first is the diverging range 
test.
The spoofed aircraft must not diverge from the target aircraft or TCAS drops 
the intruding aircraft. TCAS-FIE program measures this requirement by calculat-
ing the range rate using Eq. 4 [19]. Essentially, the aircraft must always gaining 
distance on one another versus separating.
1 is the measured angle between the spoofed aircraft’s heading and the closing vec-
tor between the spoofed aircraft and target aircraft. 1 is always zero, as the ground 
station’s signal takes the most direct path to the target. 2 is the measured angle 
between the target aircraft’s heading and the closing vector between the target air-
craft and the spoofed aircraft. 2 changes at each measurement. Figure 4 provides a 
visual for this measurement process.
If the range rate is 0 or positive, TCAS-FIE marks the aircraft as converging. 
The target aircraft continues tracking the spoofed aircraft. Contrarily, if the range 
rate is negative, the individual simulation ends in error. Diverging aircraft cannot 
have an RA reported [13]. Additionally, a diverging aircraft track possibly drops 
from the target aircraft’s TCAS system.
(4)RangeRate = SpoofedVelocity ∗ cos(1) + Target Velocity ∗ cos(2)
Fig. 4  Closing vector: A visual 
to show the angles between 
the spoofed aircraft (gray) and 
target aircraft (black) headings 
(color figure online)
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3.6.4  TAU range test
The next range test is the TAU range test. TAU is the horizontal measurement that 
determines the necessity of a TA or RA. TAU is the number of seconds until the 
impact or closest point of approach. TCAS-FIE uses Eq. 5 to calculate TAU with 
each reply [7, 20]:
R is the range between the target and the spoofed aircraft. SMOD is listed as a dis-
tance surveillance modifier, and it is equivalent to 3 NMI [7]. rdot is the range rate. 
Using range rate and the SMOD modifier, the TAU calculation in TCAS-FIE is:
If the TAU calculation is less than the 35-second threshold, the ground attacker suc-
cessfully meets the range requirement, and TCAS triggers an RA. If TAU is greater 
than the 35-second threshold, the process of UF and DF 0 interrogations and replies 
continue.
3.6.5  Altitude test
The altitude test compares the altitude of the target aircraft and the spoofed aircraft. 
If the altitude comparison has an altitude difference of less than or equal to 700 feet, 
the spoofed aircraft meets the altitude requirement for an RA. This is always true as 
the ground attacker copies the altitude of the target aircraft from each reply.
4  Validation and verification
This section presents simulations that focus on the validation and verification of the 
processes and tests within TCAS-FIE. The simulation tests include the positioning/
tracking process, the bearing constraint check, and the range test failure requirement.
4.1  Positioning and tracking
The following example of positioning and tracking accuracy is for one particular set 
of variables; however, it maintains across all sets. This simulation has a starting dis-
tance of 30 miles and 45,000 feet altitude. The (x,y,z) coordinate set for this exam-


















SpoofVelo + Target Velo ∗ cos(|180 − Target Heading + SpoofHeading|)
∗ 3600
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process is identical despite the starting location. The starting bearing is 270 degrees. 
The initial reply arrives with the spoofed aircraft inserted with a bearing of approx-
imately 45 degrees. After a 5.416566 second interrogation period, the target aircraft 
turns left 1 degree. The total time at this point is 5.417301 seconds. The aircraft spends 
0.000735 seconds with a bearing of 270 and 5.416566 with a bearing of 269. With the 
original 0.000735s, mathematically, the position updates to:
Next, the 5.416566 seconds of a bearing of 269 degrees updates the position:
Using the new (x,y,z) coordinates, the distance between the target aircraft and the 
ground station is 161348 feet. TCAS-FIE’s code produces the same value, shown in 
the code readout below, demonstrating that it accurately tracks and updates aircraft 
positioning based on speed, time, and bearing. constraint.
4.2  Bearing constraint
The bearing constraint verification/validation test uses the same relative location as the 
positioning/tracking test. The bearing measurements are accurate, as shown by the veri-
fied and validated tracking process. The bearing constraint’s verification and validation 
ensure TCAS-FIE stops when a bearing reporting exceeds ± 5 degrees from the aver-
age of the first three bearing reports. The first bearing is 44.9999 degrees. The second 
bearing is 42.4739 degrees. The third bearing reporting is 39.8848. The average of the 
bearings is 42.4529. The next reported bearing is 37.05223. It exceeds the bearing con-
straint of ± 5 degrees. The following code printout from TCAS-FIE shows the bearing 
exceeds the constraint.
(7)
x = 112005.71414 + (888ft/s ∗ 0.000735s ∗ sin(270))
= 112005.06146
y = 112005.71414 + (888ft/s ∗ 0.000735s ∗ cos(270))
= 112005.71414
(8)
x = 112005.06146 + (888ft/s ∗ 5.416566s ∗ sin(269))
= 107195.8834
y = 112005.06146 + (888ft/s ∗ 5.416566s ∗ cos(269))
= 111921.7696
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4.3  Range test failure
Using the same coordinates as the previous simulations, the range test’s verifica-
tion and validation occur. The bearing changes to 45 degrees, simulating an air-
craft moving away. The test sets the target aircraft speed greater than the spoofed 
aircraft. After the third reply, the next reply must not have a range rate of less 
than 10 ft/s. The target aircraft moves away at a faster rate than the spoofed air-
craft, so it is diverging. The code printout below illustrates the simulation termi-
nating due to diverging aircraft.
5  Results and analysis
This section details the overall results of the 555,000 simulations. The analysis 
includes general statistics and more in-depth descriptive statistics to gain a proper 
understanding of false injection viability. Lastly, with detailed analytical results, 
the section presents a threat heat map of locations representing the highest risk of 
a successful, false injection attack.
5.1  Requirements for success
The following subsection details the simulation success requirements. These 
include interrogation/reply, range, and bearing requirements. Altitude is not a 
requirement for success because the spoofed aircraft’s altitude reflects that of the 
target’s reported altitude.
5.1.1  Interrogation and reply requirements
Bearing and TAU measurements are necessary for false injection success. Bear-
ing and TAU calculation require at least three interrogations and subsequent 
replies. After three interrogations and replies, the target aircraft calculates TAU 
and bearing for RA determination. Thus, for success, the simulation requires at 
least four interrogations and replies.
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5.1.2  Range requirements
The two success requirements of the range test in the simulation are the diverging 
range test and the range TAU calculation. If a range closure rate of fewer than 10 
feet per second occurs, the simulation terminates. Additionally, the simulation is 
successful if TAU is less than 35 seconds, there are at least four interrogations 
and replies.
5.1.3  Bearing requirements
A successful simulation occurs if the spoofed aircraft bearing change is less than 
5 degrees from the projected bearing path until RA issuance. If a bearing change 
over 5 degrees occurs, the simulation terminates.
5.2  Initial results
This subsection discusses the simulations’ initial results with a focus on the end 
of simulation TAU calculations.
5.2.1  TAU average
Each simulation calculates the final TAU value upon failure. TCAS-FIE writes 
the TAU value for each of the 500 simulations in a set. Further processing aver-
ages the ending TAU values for each set. The sets with an average TAU value ≤ to 
35 seconds are successful. The overall success of the 555,000 trials is 32.6305%. 
Upon inspection, the most useful variables in displaying simulation success are 
range and starting relative bearing. Figure  5 displays the TAU averages. The 
x-axis is the starting relative bearing between the target aircraft and the ground 
station. Table 3 shows the altitude scheme for each line in Fig. 5.
In Fig. 5, the horizontal black line indicates the TAU threshold of 35 seconds. 
Lines below this threshold indicate a starting relative bearing, altitude, and range 
combination that 50% of the time successfully satisfy all required TCAS tests. 
Most TAU values fall above the minimum 35-second TAU threshold, as evident 
by the chart. TAU decreases and success increases as altitude and range lower.
5.3  In‑depth analysis
The previous section focused on a statistical average TAU calculation with a hard 
comparison against the TAU limit. The following section in-depth analyses each 
set’s descriptive statistics: skewness, kurtosis, and standard deviation. Lastly, the 
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section discusses the transformation of non-normal data sets to meet normal dis-
tribution criteria.
5.3.1  Skewness
Skewness is the representation of the asymmetry within a data set [21]. A nor-
mally distributed data set has a skewness value of 0. If the skewness value is 
negative, the data distribute more to the mean’s left. Additionally, the tail of the 
left side is longer than the right side. In contrast, if the skewness value is positive, 
the data distribute more to mean’s right, and the right tail is longer.
West et  al. [22] set the skewness guidelines for normally distributed data as 


























Fig. 5  First-Look TAU Values: Each line represents a different range and altitude pair. The lines repre-
sents the TAU value as relative bearing increases and decreases (color figure online)






 J. Hannah et al.
1 3
The detailed analysis determines the skewness value for each set of 500 simulations. 
Figure 6 shows all skewness values with the thresholds of [-2.1, 2.1]. There are 28 
data sets over the skewness limits.
5.3.2  Kurtosis
Kurtosis is the fourth sample moment about the mean, and it describes the tail 
heaviness compared to an even normal distribution [23]. A kurtosis value greater 
than 3 represents leptokurtic data, implying that the distribution tails are heavy 
compared to normal distribution. A kurtosis value of less than 3 represents play-
tkurtic data, implying that the distribution tails are thinner compared to a normal 
distribution curve. The kurtosis value for normal distribution is three and known 
as mesokurtic. Equation 10 calculates the kurtosis of data.
(9)Skewness =
√








Fig. 6  Original Kurtosis and Skewness values: orange represents kurtosis values, and green represents 
skewness values (color figure online)
1 3
Traffic collision avoidance system: false injection viability 
In data that has occasional data outliers, excess kurtosis is the standard measure-
ment. The excess kurtosis value for normal distribution is 0 [24]. West et al. [22] 
set the kurtosis guidelines for normally distributed data as 3 ± 4.1 . That range is for 
proper kurtosis. The range for excess kurtosis is 0 ± 4.1 . The detailed analysis deter-
mines the kurtosis value for each set of 500 simulations. Figure 6 shows all com-
puted kurtosis values and the normal distribution thresholds of -4.1 and 4.1. There 
are 42 simulations with kurtosis values that exceed the threshold. Those data sets 
require manipulation.
5.3.3  Box cox transformation
Sets of data with kurtosis or skewness values that exceed recommended thresh-
olds require transformation. Osborne recommends using the Box-Cox trans-
formation as it provides multiple transformation options for data, choosing the 
option that best transforms the data from non-normal to normal distribution [25]. 
He provides Eq. 11, the equation used to transform each data point:
The detailed analysis determines λ by trial and error of different λ values [25]. The λ 
value chosen is the one that provides skewness and kurtosis values closest to 0.
This Box-Cox transformation is applied to data sets of 500 that do not adhere 
to the skewness and kurtosis values. After the Box-Cox transformation, all outli-
ers transform to data sets that meet normality considerations. Figure 7 is the new 
graph with all transformed data sets.
5.3.4  Standard deviation analysis
Normally distributed data sets present probability analysis capabilities. The key 
statistics used from each data set are the mean and standard deviation. Addition-
ally, the target TAU value is ≤ 35 seconds. The following equation uses the mean, 
standard deviation, and X value (TAU) to calculate a z-score.
The Z-score calculated compares to a Z-table that lists the appropriate probability 
for the Z-score. The Z-score accurately depicts the successful false injection prob-











(12)P(TAU ≤ 35) =
35 − 
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5.3.5  Threat map
The false injection probabilities allow the creation of an accurate threat heat map for 
potential aircraft. The color and percentage legend for the threat maps is:
• Highly Possible (Probability of Success ≥ 70%)—Red areas represent ranges and 
relative bearings that false injection attacks are highly successful.
• Moderately Possible (40% ≥ Probability of Success <70%)—Yellow areas repre-
sent ranges and relative bearings that false injection attacks are moderately suc-
cessful.
• Not Likely Possible (Probability of Success ≤ 40%)—Green areas represent 
ranges and relative bearings that false injection attacks are likely to be unsuc-
cessful.
Figure 8 represents the threat map for an aircraft at 45,000 feet. Aircraft that appear 
and maintain a track in green areas of the threat map project as real aircraft. Con-
versely, aircraft that appear and maintain a track within red areas cannot be validated 
as real or falsely injected until visual identification occurs.
The threat heatmap provides pilots with an accurate understanding of the dis-
tances and relative bearings vulnerable to a false injection at 45,000 feet altitude. 
Fig. 7  Kurtosis and Skewness After Data Transformation: Orange represents kurtosis values, and green 
represents skewness values (color figure online)
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In the event of a TCAS anomaly in flight, the maps provide the pilot an extra tool to 
determine between system failure due to outside influence or just mechanical system 
failure.
A bearing specific aspect from the map is that a 0-degree relative bearing from 
the target aircraft to the ground-based attacker presents the perfect scenario for false 
injection. If the attacker times the Mode S responses correctly, false injection attacks 
are always successful with a 0-degree relative bearing.
A range specific aspect from the map is the closer, an attacker is horizontal to the 
target aircraft, the more successful the false injection attack is. If an aircraft is close 
enough, i.e., 5 miles out, the TAU calculation always falls within the ≤ 35 seconds 
RA issuance window.
6  Discussion
The following section discusses the overall security impact of a false injection attack 
against aircraft. Additionally, the authors present solutions to mitigate the vulnera-
bility and capability for an attacker to successfully complete a false injection attack.
6.1  Security impact
Berges et al. [1] proposed and successfully created TCAS Mode S messages. Fol-
lowing on, the authors of this paper orchestrated the requirements to use those mes-
sages for a successful false injection attack. The ability to create TCAS Mode S mes-
sages paired with known flight paths that successfully satisfy range, altitude, power, 
Fig. 8  45,000 feet Threat Map: Threat map for ranges and relative bearings at 45,000 feet (color figure 
online)
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and bearing requirements present a true attack vector for adversaries discussed in 
this paper. The success plausibility of this attack presents doubt, even if minute, in 
the integrity of a TCAS screen. Doubt in integrity, creates distrust for pilots. A sys-
tem responsible for numerous lives, necessitates complete pilot trust, so solutions to 
this attack capability require exploration. The future work subsection explores pos-
sible solutions for future research.
7  Conclusion
This research introduced a novel method for a ground-based adversary to attack 
an operational aircraft’s critical safety system (TCAS). The research goal is to 
time Mode S messages, simulating a moving aircraft, resulting in the insertion of 
a spoofed aircraft onto the target’s TCAS. The ultimate goal, triggering an RA, 
requires the spoofed aircraft to adeptly satisfy the received signal power test, the 
range test, the altitude test, and the bearing constraint requirements. Additionally, 
the spoofed aircraft needs four successful replies. TCAS-FIE covers a variance of 
ranges, altitudes, and starting relative bearings.
After the completion of 555,000 simulations, Sect. 5 provided fundamental and 
detailed descriptive statistics analysis yielding the predictive threat heat maps for 
each altitude tested. These maps offer situation awareness to pilots in time of uncer-
tainty with the TCAS system. The results show that a false injection attack is suc-
cessful under certain range, altitude, and bearing circumstances.
This paper aims to enhance the knowledge of TCAS vulnerabilities, specifically, 
the false injection vulnerability. Several companies and agencies rely on the use 
of the TCAS system with 100% integrity. Additionally, this paper aspires to drive 
research into TCAS false injection solutions.
7.1  Future work
The implemented false injection attack creates the foundation and should provide 
the motivation for additional research. The next three research areas should be on 
possible solutions proposed by the authors, interrogation/reply periodicity, and veri-
fication of the created threat maps with the discussed time between interrogations 
and replies.
7.1.1  Proposed solutions
A mitigation strategy for the proposed false injection vulnerability requires securing 
the TCAS message generation process. The TCAS specification requires the system 
to accept any received message from a correctly addressed aircraft [5]. A method to 
increase integrity and message security would rely on a distributed voting algorithm, 
where the sender communicates its current air picture, to include aircraft positioning 
data, to surrounding aircraft. Any discrepancies would require actions to validate the 
1 3
Traffic collision avoidance system: false injection viability 
sender’s authenticity. Further, this allows the verification of aircraft positioning data, 
further enhancing the viability of a particular aircraft’s current TCAS picture.
A potential area of exploration to curb ground-based false injection attacks is the 
altitude processing by TCAS. TCAS uses the altitude reported in Mode S messages 
by placing the aircraft at the reported altitude. A plausible solution requires aircraft 
to verify altitude by a vertical angle of arrival verification. The reported altitude and 
measured vertical angle of arrival comparison gives TCAS an additional verifica-
tion tool on determining requirements for RA issuance. Without a trusted altitude, 
aircraft cannot trigger an RA, only a TA [7].
7.1.2  Interrogation/reply periodicity
Interrogations and replies have mandated timelines [10]. Technical specifications 
for Mode S include 132.75 microseconds between the first interrogation pulse and 
the first interrogation reply pulse. The accuracy of this timing specification requires 
verification. This mandated delay allows the possibility of a false injection. With-
out the delay, the ability to falsely inject a spoofed aircraft becomes difficult and 
improbable. Accurately measuring the delay requires an operational TCAS system. 
The delay becomes observable during the communication process.
7.1.3  Real‑world implementation
In addition to verifying interrogation and reply periodicity, the developed message 
timing and threat maps require validation with real-world systems. With technical 
specifications and other open-source documents, this paper developed threat maps. 
TCAS-FIE simulations calculate TAU measurements for each data set of range, alti-
tude, and relative bearing. Additionally, TCAS-FIE calculates the required timing 
for each message. An operational SDR, antenna, and target TCAS can test the threat 
map and timing developed.
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